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Knowledge and skill are intimately connected. In this essay, I discuss the question of 
their relationship and of which (if any) is prior to which in the order of explanation. I 
review some of the answers that have been given thus far in the literature, with a 
particular focus on the many foundational issues in epistemology that intersect with the 
philosophy of skill.  
 
1 Introduction 
Knowledge and skill are intimately connected. Scientists cannot get new knowledge 
without developing their skills for devising experiments. And skilled artists, scientists, 
and mathematicians must know a lot about their area of expertise in order to perform 
skillfully and routinely manifest that knowledge through their skillful performances.  
Despite this obvious interrelationship, knowledge and skill have received different 
treatment in analytic epistemology. While philosophers in this tradition have long been in 
the business of understanding and defining knowledge, the topic of skill has been 
marginalized. It is only quite recently that skills have made a powerful entrance in two 
epistemological debates: the debate on virtue epistemology and the debate on the nature 
of know how.  
In this essay, I discuss the question of the relationship between skill and 
knowledge (Section §2) and of which (if any) is prior to which in the order of explanation 
(Section §3), with an eye to highlighting the many foundational issues in epistemology 
that intersect with the philosophy of skill. In section §3, I will start discussing the 
relationship between skill and know how, which will be the main topic of the sequel to 
this essay.  
 
 
2 Knowledge, justification, and skill 
Reductive virtue epistemology defines knowledge in terms of skill (Zagzebski, 1996; 
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Sosa, 2007; Greco, 2010; Kelp, 2011; Pritchard, 2012; Kelp, 2013a; Turri, 2015). For 
example, Sosa thinks of knowledge as apt performance, where an apt performance is 
defined as a performance that is successful in virtue of one’s skill (Sosa, 1995; Sosa, 
2007; Sosa, 2009; Sosa, 2011; Sosa, 2015). To use one of Sosa’s famous examples, 
consider an archer attempting to hit the bullseye. She may succeed by luck, as when, even 
though unskilled, she gets a favorable gust of wind that guides the arrow to the bullseye; 
or as when, even though she shoots skillfully, unfavorable weather conditions first divert, 
then redirect the arrow into the bullseye. In both cases, the performance is successful, but 
not so in virtue of the agent’s skill. Hence, a performance may be successful, even skillful 
(for it is caused by the skill), without being apt. According to this sort of virtue 
epistemology, knowledge is just an instance of apt performance — i.e., a performance 
that is successful in virtue of one’s cognitive or perceptual skill. 
This definition succeeds in its reductive goals only provided that cognitive and 
perceptual skills are not themselves best understood in terms of knowledge.1 Virtue 
epistemologists tend to define such skills in terms of dispositions to believe truly 
(Zagzebski, 1996; Greco, 2010; Pritchard, 2005; Pritchard, 2007; Sosa, 2010). But some 
have pointed out that it is controversial whether one can understand cognitive skills 
independently of the concept of knowledge. Millar argues that cognitive and perceptual 
skills are themselves abilities to know — a sort of ability that is not exercised, or one that 
is exercised but not manifested, when knowledge is not attained (Millar, 2009). Along 
similar lines, Miracchi proposes that knowledge is a manifestation of a competence to 
know, thereby seemingly underwriting the claim that at least cognitive and perceptual 
skills can be defined in terms of knowledge (Miracchi, 2015). Finally, Stanley and 
Williamson propose that skill in general (and not just cognitive and perceptual skill) is a 
sort of disposition to know (Stanley & Williamson, 2016). 
What decides between the view according to which knowledge is skillful 
performance of some sort — a view that defines knowledge in terms of skill — and a 
view according to which skills are themselves knowledge or at least definable in terms of 
																																																								
1 I am using the expression ‘cognitive skill’ to refer to any ability that manifest through some cognitive 
state, such as belief, or knowledge. Cognitive skill is to be contrasted with non-cognitive skill, which 
primarily manifests not through cognitive states, but through actions. 
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knowledge? Virtue epistemologists argue that their analysis of knowledge provides the 
resources for a satisfactory solution of the Gettier problem —	the problem of explaining 
what Gettiered subjects lack over and above their true and justified beliefs (Gettier, 
1963). Suppose skills are dispositions to believe truly and suppose a subject exercises 
one’s skill to believe truly when forming a particular belief. The subject may thereby be 
justified in so believing, may also succeed in attaining a true belief, and nonetheless fail 
to know. According to virtue epistemologists, in Gettier cases, subjects’ true justified 
belief is not attained because of their skill —	 i.e.,	 the exercise of their skill explains the 
presence of the belief and why the belief is justified, but it does not explain its 
correctness (Sosa, 2007, pp. 95-96). 
Thus, one motivation for defining knowledge in terms of skill and for identifying 
skill with a disposition to be in an epistemic state that falls short of knowledge is that, by 
doing so, one may be able to offer an illuminating solution of the Gettier problem. The 
recent literature has, however, questioned whether an analysis of knowledge as apt belief 
can account for the full range of Gettier cases. To begin with, barn façade cases are a 
notoriously thorny problem for virtue epistemology (Lackey, 2007; Pritchard, 2012; 
Kelp, 2013a): suppose one sees a barn in a county that happens to be replete with fake 
barns that perceptually look exactly like real barns. On the basis of that perceptual 
experience, one forms the belief that one is looking at a barn. The belief happens to be 
true and so in virtue of the exercise of one’s perceptual competences, yet intuitively it is 
not knowledge.2  
Moreover, some have observed that there seem to be other examples of justified 
true beliefs that fall short of knowledge that are not straightforward to account in terms of 
lack of an apt belief. For example, Miracchi proposes the following variant of Chisholm’s 
Gettier case (Chisholm, 1966): Annette sees what appears to be a sheep in the field in 
front of her, and consequently believes there is a sheep in the field. As a matter of fact, 
Annette is gazing at a sheep dog. However, there is a sheep in the field; moreover, she 
																																																								
2 Sosa accepts the conclusion that the subject in barn façade county knows that she is looking at a barn 
(Sosa, 2010); however, Sosa takes the knowledge in question to be animal knowledge (apt belief) rather 
than reflective knowledge (aptly believing that one aptly believes). According to Sosa, then, our intuitions 
in this example track the lack of the subject’s reflective knowledge. But many find this diagnosis 
unattractive (Pritchard, 2012; Kelp 2013). 
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inhabits a region where sheep dogs invariably accompany sheep. Miracchi contends that 
Annette’s belief is true as the result of the exercise of a belief-forming competence. 
Nonetheless, intuitively, her belief does not amount to knowledge (Miracchi, 2015).3   
Thus, it is still an open question whether or not virtue epistemology can provide a 
satisfactory explanation of the full range of Gettier cases. Hence, it is still an open 
question whether a solution to the Gettier problem should be counted among the 
theoretical benefits of an analysis of knowledge in terms of skill.4 What are, on the other 
hand, the prospects for understanding skill in terms of knowledge?  
A characterization of skill in terms of ability to know (or in terms of a 
competence to know) is not clearly reductive, for it is easy to read “ability” (and 
“competence”) in terms of skill. A better option is to think of skill as a disposition to 
know (Stanley & Williamson, 2016). But also this identification faces some prima facie 
problems. If we say that every sort of skill is a disposition to know, we must take every 
skill to primarily manifest in knowledge states, and only secondarily in actions. But if so, 
then there seems to be an important and commonsensical distinction between cognitive 
skill (like solving a math problem) and non-cognitive skill (like playing tennis) that this 
view obliterates.  
Now, suppose we restrict the view to the case of cognitive skills. Even in this 
case, one may object to their identification with dispositions to know on the ground that 
dispositions to know are not obviously necessary for cognitive skills. Suppose George 
reliably forms true beliefs about trivia questions but an evil demon makes sure that every 
time that happens, George is given misleading evidence that his beliefs are incorrect. 
Because at each occasion his beliefs are not supported by evidence, at each occasion, 
George fails to know. But although George does not have a disposition to know those 
answers in those particular cases, he is arguably still skilled at trivia. 
In response, one may point out that this sort of cases should be described as ones 
where the disposition to know is present but is  “masked” — in this case by the provision 
of misleading evidence. On the other hand, the sufficiency of dispositions to know for 
cognitive skills is also controversial. Consider the skill of solving math problems. On a 																																																								
3 For even more elaborate cases, see (Summerford, 2000; Baehr, 2006; Miracchi, 2015). 
4 Another prominent attempt to reduce propositional knowledge to skill (and know how) is due to 
(Hetherington, 2006).	
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view on which cognitive skills are dispositions to know, it is tempting to identify such 
cognitive skill with the disposition to know the correct solutions to math problems. But 
now, suppose one has the disposition to know the correct solution to math problems in 
virtue of having a disposition to look at and to trust one’s smart phone, which has a 
reliable math app. Clearly, one is not thereby skilled at solving math problems.5 That 
suggests that a persuasive defense of a view of skills as dispositions to know needs to say 
more about what dispositions count (e.g., how extrinsic the dispositions are allowed to be 
and what kind of knowledge they need to manifest through).  
 
3. Skill before knowledge? 
We have looked at virtue epistemological attempts to define knowledge in terms of skill 
and at one attempt to define skill in terms of knowledge —	i.e., in terms of dispositions to 
know. Another possibility is to think of skill directly in terms of standing propositional 
knowledge states. I will discuss this sort of view in some detail later in the sequel to this 
essay.   
Whether or not the reductive project of defining skill or knowledge in terms of the 
other can be accomplished, it remains nonetheless a meaningful and interesting question 
whether skill or knowledge (as well as other epistemic properties) is prior to the other in 
the order of explanation, for example, because the possession of one is needed for the 
possession of the other.   
 In many cases, a skillful action seems to require knowledge — just like a skillful 																																																								5	Maybe the right thing to say in response is, instead, that while the subject in the example may not be 
skilled at solving math problems, nonetheless the subject does have the skill to solve math problems: 
having the skill to solve math questions does not amount to being skilled at solving math problems, given 
how that phrase is normally used. But this response comes with the cost of having to reject a plausible 
principle linking skill possession and the property of being skilled. The following seems like a plausible 
principle bridging skill possession and the property of being skilled: one is skilled at Φ-ing relative to a 
context c just in case one possesses the skill to Φ to the degree fixed by c.5 According to this principle, if 
one possesses a skill to Φ but does not count as skilled at Φ-ing (relative to a context), it must be because 
one does not possess the skill to the right degree. That may be, on a view on which skills are disposition to 
know, because one’s disposition to know is not strong enough or because the knowledge that disposition 
manifests through is not sufficiently good (relative to some relevant standards). The problem now is that, 
for any degree at which one might possess that disposition, we may envisage a case like the above smart 
phone’s app case where one is disposed to know (to that degree) the solution to math questions (perhaps 
because the smart phone’s app is reliable to that degree or provides answers that are qualitatively good to 
that degree) and yet one does not intuitively count as skilled at solving math problems.  	
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radiologist needs plenty of medical knowledge and skillful sailor requires knowledge of 
the boat, of the sea, and of the best circumstances for sailing. It is tempting, on the basis 
of these examples, to claim that skillful action is action guided by knowledge, thereby 
prioritizing knowledge over skills in the order of explanation (Stanley, 2011). 
Contra this sort of position, Dickie argues that skill comes before knowledge for 
it is only by appeal to skill that one can explain the kind of knowledge that a skillful 
agent manifests through their actions (Dickie, 2012). Compare Robin Hood and the 
Sheriff of Nottingham, who are both shooting at a willow wand 250 yards away. Robin is 
an expert archer, while the Sheriff is a poor one. This means, roughly, that when Robin 
intends to shoot at a target, his intention reliably generates a pattern of behavior that, 
unless his situation is radically unlucky, will result in success. This is not so for the 
Sheriff. Now, Dickie points out that it is helpful to explain Robin’s skillful shooting in 
terms of Robin’s grasp of a proposition about how to shoot in those circumstances. And 
that that grasp may well satisfy all the conditions for knowledge: it may be produced 
reliably, it might involve a doxastic commitment, and so on. However, Dickie argues that 
that does not mean that skillful actions are therefore guided by knowledge — i.e., that 
knowledge is prior to skill in the order of explanation. Skillful actions may be guided 
instead by skill and the knowledge that accompanies skillful actions may just be a 
manifestation of the skill’s guidance.  
In fact, Dickie thinks that this latter view — one assigning skill priority over 
knowledge in the order of explanation — has a significant advantage over a view that 
assigns knowledge priority over skill. Her argument here relies on the consideration of 
the ‘myriad routes to skill acquisition’ (Dickie, 2012, p. 741). Skill can be acquired by 
inborn talent, mindless repetition, unreflective imitation, hypnosis, induction from past 
attempts, reflection from first principles, and so on. According to Dickie, the 
heterogeneity of this list generates an objection to an ‘intellectualist’ view that thinks of 
skill in terms of knowledge. For an account of the propositional knowledge that guides 
our skillful action needs a justification component. And it is natural to explain the 
justificatory component of the knowledge that guides a skillful action by appeal to skill 
rather than to evidence of the usual sort. By contrast, it is less clear that a view that 
explains skill in terms of propositional knowledge has the resources for a distinctively 
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practical story about how the skilled Φ-er comes by his or her knowledge that w is a way 
to Φ. So Dickie concludes that “an intellectualist looking for the justification component 
of the skilled Φ-er’s propositional knowledge is thrown back on the standard array of 
accounts of how propositional knowledge is justified” (Dickie, 2011, pp. 740-742). 
Some might question whether a view that explains skill in terms of propositional 
knowledge really lacks the resources for a distinctively practical story about how the 
skilled Φ-er comes by his or her knowledge that w is a way to Φ. Suppose one identifies a 
skill at Φ-ing with the sort of knowledge about how to Φ that one manifests through 
skillful actions of Φ-ing and think of such knowledge as an ability to use information for 
the purpose of action. On this view, the choice of appropriate means to ends is itself 
guided by a standing propositional knowledge state — say, a state of knowing what to do 
when. It is compatible with this view to hold that one cannot be in such a knowledge state 
without possessing a variety of abilities and capacities — which are pre-conditions for 
being in that knowledge state (Pavese, 2015b, pp. 16-17). Such abilities and capacities 
are not themselves skills because 1) in contrast with, for example, Robin Hood’s skill at 
archery, they may not be task-specific and because 2) whereas a skill at Φ-ing 
characteristically manifests through doings — acts of Φ-ing — such abilities do not 
characteristically manifest through acts (rather they may manifest through operations that 
are not acts or in states rather than acts). Hence, on a view that distinguishes between 
skill and the kind of abilities that make a skill possible, the justificatory component of the 
relevant knowledge can be explained in terms of those basic and underlying capacities 
rather than in terms of (standardly conceived) evidence.  
The same considerations may be relevant to assess virtue epistemology’s appeal 
to skills for the purpose of blocking the regress of justification (Sosa, 1980; Bonjour & 
Sosa, 2003). Virtue epistemologists have pointed out that a convenient way to stop the 
regress of justification (or evidence) is to appeal to a non-propositional justifier in order 
to explain the justificatory status of at least some of our beliefs — those most basic and 
fundamental. Our discussion thus far indicates that it is an open question whether skill, 
rather than any other sort of mental ability that is not a skill, is needed for that purpose. A 
satisfactory answer to these questions may require a more sophisticated taxonomy of 
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skills and abilities than is available at present.6 
I sketched a view on which skill is prior to knowledge and one on which 
knowledge is prior to skill. A third possible route consists in taking neither skill nor 
knowledge to be prior to the other in the order of explanation and explaining both in 
terms of something more primitive. One example is a view that takes both skillfulness 
and knowledge to be susceptible of a modal reduction (Beddor & Pavese, manuscript).7  
What are the prospects for a unified modal reduction of skillfulness and knowledge?  
According to an influential tradition in epistemology, knowledge requires safety 
from error: if S knows p, then S’s belief that p could not easily have been false. Given a 
possible-worlds semantics for modals, this amounts to saying that, if S knows p, then in 
all the nearby possible worlds where S believes p, p is true.8 Safety is the most plausible 
modal requirement on knowledge. And some even take a definition of knowledge in 
terms of safe beliefs as a working hypothesis.9 By contrast, a performance may be skillful 
even though unsafe or risky — just like a skillful hitting a home run can be highly risky 
and a very successful player may succeed at it only one time in nine (Beddor and Pavese, 
manuscript). Because knowledge seems to require safety while skillful performance does 
not, some have thought that a unified modal reduction of knowledge and skillfulness is 
not feasible (Sosa, 2007, pp. 29-31; Pritchard, 2012). 
 As Beddor & Pavese argue, however, it would be a mistake to conclude that 
skillful performance is not subject to a modal condition, or that the project of reducing 
both skillfulness and knowledge to a unified modal property is doomed (Beddor & 
Pavese, manuscript). We might just need to formulate the relevant modal condition 
differently: for example, we might require, for any performance to count as skillful, that 
it succeed not in every nearby world but in the sufficiently high percentage of nearby 
worlds, where the right percentage may be determined by the rate of success at the 
relevant task that a subject would need to meet in order to qualify as skillful at Φ-ing. 																																																								
6 A similar reply consists in distinguishing between virtues and skills. See (Zagzebski, 1996) for a clearer 
distinction between virtues and skills. 7	Beddor & Pavese, “The modal dimensions of skillfulness and knowledge.”	
8 For sympathetic discussions of a safety requirement, see Sosa, 1999; Sosa, 2004; Williamson, 2000; 
Williamson, 2009; Pritchard, 2005; Lasonen-Aarnio, 2010; Pritchard, 2012; Greco, 2015. For detractors, 
see Comesaña, 2005; Neta & Rohrbaugh, 2004; Bogardus, 2014. 
9 For example, see Williamson, 2009. 
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Call this requirement “modal robustness.” Then we can say that, whereas for some tasks, 
such as hitting a home run, even just success at 9% of the nearby worlds suffices for the 
performance to count as skillful, for belief nothing less than 100% is sufficiently high. In 
this way, we get safety for belief as a special case of a general modal property — i.e., 
modal robustness — of performances (Beddor & Pavese, manuscript). 
 
4 Skills and Know how 
It is hard to talk about skill without talking about know how. In fact, skill is routinely 
ascribed through know how ascriptions. Some languages, such as Italian and French, do 
not even have a designated word for skill distinct from their word for ability or from their 
word for talent, and they systematically ascribe skill through ascriptions of know how 
(i.e., through ascriptions which would be translated in English by ascriptions of the form 
“S knows how to Φ”).10  
Moreover, for many tasks at least, it is intuitive that one cannot be skilled at it 
without knowing how to perform it. For example, a skilled brain surgeon must know how 
to perform brain surgery. And I cannot be skilled at using the computer if I do not know 
how to use it. If so, then being skilled at Φ-ing seems to require knowing how to Φ. 
Finally, it also seems as if know how entails skill: one does not really know how to swim 
if one does not have the skill to swim; and one cannot know how to tell apart birds 
without the skills of a bird watcher. Quite generally, it is a platitude that one has savoir 
faire, or know how, with respect to a certain task only if one has the skill to perform it.  
One might object to the sufficiency of know how for skill on the grounds that it is 
natural to say things such as “John may know how to make risotto, but I would not say he 
is skilled at it.” But there is a natural explanation of the acceptability of that kind of 
sentences, which is compatible with the sufficiency of know how for skill. Gradable 
adjectives such as “skilled” quantify over degrees above a certain threshold — in this 
case over degrees of skillfulness above a certain threshold. So sentences predicating the 
adjective “skilled” of a subject S are true only provided that S exceeds a contextually 																																																								
10 As will be discussed in the sequel to this essay, the relevant ascriptions slightly differ from English 
ascriptions of know how in that they do not embed an interrogative, but rather an infinitival complement, so 
their form is “S knows + Φ-ing” rather than “S knows + (interrogative) How to Φ.” 
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fixed threshold (Kennedy, 2007). If so, we are in position to predict that one may know 
how to make risotto without counting as skilled at risotto making. That will happen 
whenever the contextually determined standards for being skilled are sufficiently high. 
However, note that knowing how to make risotto sufficiently well (relative to contextually 
determined standards) will entail being skilled at it (relative to the same standards). So, 
although know how does not strictly speaking entail being skilled, knowing how above a 
certain qualitative (and contextually fixed) threshold does.11 
It is therefore not all surprising that skill and know how were identified by Ryle in 
his criticism of the “Intellectualist legend” (Ryle, 1945; Ryle, 1949). In The Concept of 
Mind, Ryle uses “know how” and “skill” interchangeably (Ryle, 1949). For example, we 
are told that “though it is proper to ask for the grounds or reasons for someone’s 
acceptance of a proposition, this question cannot be asked of someone’s skills at cards...” 
and that “skillful is an action that manifests know how” (Ryle, 1949, p. 29). Because 
plausibly an action is skillful only if it manifests a skill, this textual evidence suggests 
that Ryle did identify skill and know how. In fact, his view of know how as a complex of 
dispositions is stated, literally, as the view that skill is a complex of dispositions (Ryle, 
1949, p. 33).  
Ryle’s distinction between know how, on one hand, and propositional knowledge 
on the other hand has been challenged by so-called intellectualists about knowing how 
(Ginet, 1975; Stanley & Williamson, 2001; Snowdon, 2004; Stanley, 2011b; Pavese, 
2015a; Pavese, 2015b). According to intellectualism about knowing how, know how is 
just a species of propositional knowledge. Because Ryle has identified know how and 
skill, it has been commonly assumed that the Intellectualist attack to a Rylean conception 
of intelligent action had focused both on know how and on skill.12 However, the initial 
debate on intellectualism about knowing how has not explicitly nor systematically 
addressed the question of the relation between know how and skill. In their pioneering 																																																								
11 Glick does argue that know how entails ability (Glick, 2011a) and Hawley argues that ability is to be 
thought of as counterfactual success (Hawley, 2003). If one embraces the entailment from know how to 
counterfactual success, one is likely to accept that know how must entail skill. See also Beddor & Pavese 
(manuscript, “The Modal Dimensions of Skillfulness and Knowledge”).  
12 For example, in her incisive critiques of Stanley, Fridland attributes to Stanley the view that skills are 
propositional knowledge (Fridland, 2014). 
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paper defending intellectualism about knowing how, Stanley and Williamson distinguish 
between know how and abilities (Stanley & Williamson, 2001, p. 416) but nowhere do 
they use the word “skill.” However, in their joint paper, Stanley and Williamson 
explicitly reject the view that skills are standing propositional knowledge states (Stanley 
& Williamson, 2016). Here, they make clear that while they embrace the view that know 
how is propositional knowledge, they refuse to think of skill as a standing propositional 
knowledge state. 
This discussion brings us to the question of whether intellectualism about 
knowing how and intellectualism about skill stand or fall together. I will tackle this issue 
in the sequel to this essay.  
 
5. Conclusion 
The debate on skill is still very young and I cannot hope to have covered all the 
interesting issues about the nature of skill and about the relationship between skill and 
knowledge. But I hope to have at least shown that many foundational issues in 
epistemology do happen to intersect with the philosophy of skill. If so, then our 
understanding of the nature of knowledge, of the problem of the regress of justification, 
of the relation between know how and propositional knowledge may all depend on 
achieving a better understanding of what skill is as well as on a more accurate taxonomy 
of our cognitive and non-cognitive abilities. 
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